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Crossmodal and incremental  
perception of audiovisual cues to 
emotional speech
Pashiera Barkhuysen,  
Emiel Krahmer, Marc Swerts
Tilburg University
Abstract
In this article we report on two experiments about the perception of 
audiovisual cues to emotional speech. The article addresses two questions: 
(1) how do visual cues from a speaker’s face to emotion relate to audi-
tory cues, and (2) what is the recognition speed for various facial cues to 
emotion? Both experiments reported below are based on tests with video 
clips of  emotional utterances collected via a variant of  the well-known 
Velten method. More specifically, we recorded speakers who displayed 
positive or negative emotions, which were congruent or incongruent with 
the (emotional) lexical content of  the uttered sentence. In order to test this, 
we conducted two experiments.
  The first experiment is a perception experiment in which Czech participants, who do not speak 
Dutch, rate the perceived emotional state of  Dutch speakers in a bimodal (audiovisual) or a 
unimodal (audio- or vision-only) condition. It was found that incongruent emotional speech leads 
to significantly more extreme perceived emotion scores than congruent emotional speech, where 
the difference between congruent and incongruent emotional speech is larger for the negative 
than for the positive conditions. Interestingly, the largest overall differences between congruent 
and incongruent emotions were found for the audio-only condition, which suggests that posing 
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  The second experiment uses a gating paradigm to test the recognition speed for various emotional 
expressions from a speaker’s face. In this experiment participants were presented with the same 
clips as experiment I, but this time presented vision-only. The clips were shown in successive 
segments (gates) of increasing duration. Results show that participants are surprisingly accurate 
in their recognition of the various emotions, as they already reach high recognition scores in the 
first gate (after only 160 ms). Interestingly, the recognition scores raise faster for positive than 
negative conditions. Finally, the gating results suggest that incongruent emotions are perceived as 
more intense than congruent emotions, as the former get more extreme recognition scores than 
the latter, already after a short period of exposure.
1 Introduction
Facial expressions are often considered to be windows to the soul, because they are 
thought to reveal the emotional state of a speaker. From a face, we may tell whether 
a person is feeling happy, sad, angry, anxious, etc. (e.g., Adolphs, 2002; Carroll & 
Russell, 1996; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). However, previous research has brought to 
light that the emotional state of a speaker can also be derived from other modalities. 
In the auditory domain, it has been shown that listeners can infer the emotional 
state from the expression of a speaker’s voice (Bachorowski, 1999; Banse & Scherer, 
1996; Scherer, 2003). Scherer (2003) states that acoustic emotional expressions occur 
at various stages (and levels) within the communication process. There is a wealth 
of neurobiological evidence suggesting that the recognition of emotion is a complex 
process that involves the cooperation of processes across various brain structures 
(Adolphs, 2002; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007).
However, while we have gained much insight into how unimodal stimuli (either 
auditory or visual) are processed, far less is known about the extent into which these 
modalities interact with each other. There is some preliminary evidence that one 
modality may have an effect on another one, as is, for example, clear from the fact that 
people are able to detect from a speaker’s voice whether he or she is showing a smile 
(Aubergé & Cathiard, 2003). It is very likely that the brain tends to bind information 
received through different modalities (referred to as intermodal or crossmodal binding) 
(see e.g., Ghazanfar, Maier, Hoffman, & Logothetis, 2005), because often it receives 
information simultaneously through different sensory systems but from the same distal 
source (Pourtois, de Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 2000), especially 
because the “sender” tends to transmit information across different modalities (Graf, 
Cosatto, Ström, & Huang, 2002). Generally speaking, this multimodal integration is 
very useful, because input from one modality can substitute another one in deteriorated 
circumstances. For example, lip-reading can be useful for speech comprehension in 
noisy environments (Calvert, Brammer, & Iversen, 1998), or vice versa, in darkness, 
auditory signals can replace visual signals (Calvert et al., 1998). Neurological studies 
have already brought to light what the nature is of different networks activated in 
different brain areas during crossmodal binding, for example when involved in audio-
visual speech processing (Calvert, 2001; Calvert et al., 1998; Sekiyama, Kanno, Miura, 
& Sugita, 2003). In the past, the binding and interaction of different modalities has 
been demonstrated very spectacularly in the so-called McGurk effect, which shows 
that the auditory perception of a sound can be altered by the display of incongruent 
visual information (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). The McGurk paradigm has been 
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a source of inspiration for studies on the perception of emotion which also use stimuli 
with congruent and incongruent auditory and visual cues to emotions (Aubergé & 
Cathiard, 2003; de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Hietanen, Marinnen, Sams, & Rusakka, 
2001). However, while much research has been done about crossmodal integration 
during audiovisual speech processing, much more needs to be done about crossmodal 
integration during the processing of emotions (e.g., de Gelder, Bocker, Tuomainen, 
Hensen, & Vroomen, 1999; Pourtois et al., 2000), when combined with audiovisual 
speech. It has been shown that the ability to integrate information from emotional 
faces with emotional prosody is already present in 7-month-old infants (Grossmann, 
Striano, & Friederici, 2006). Unfortunately, many of these studies investigating the 
recognition of emotional expressions have been based on analyses of static images, 
such as photographs or drawings (see e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972, 
pp.49–51), rather than dynamic images. As a result, little is known about the percep-
tion of emotions through “fleeting changes in the countenance of a face” (Russell, 
Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003). Often, a realistically varying speech signal is 
combined with a static face, resulting in knowledge about online auditory speech but 
not about online visual speech. Consequently, we do not yet fully understand whether 
auditory and visual cues of emotional speech differ in perceptual strength, and how 
people deal with input coming from two modalities when they have to make judgments 
about a speaker’s emotional state (in contrast to judging an emotional state without 
speech). This knowledge could be very useful for the development of computerized 
speech systems, for instance (Cohn & Katz, 1998). Therefore, the first question we want 
to explore in this article is whether the processing of emotional speech is integrated 
across modalities, that is, whether the perception of a combination of two modalities 
is more successful than the perception of a single modality alone.
A second question we want to explore is to what extent the recognition of emotion 
varies as a function of the time that people are exposed to the facial expressions 
of a speaker. There are reasons to believe that this temporal recognition process 
may vary for different kinds of emotions, such as positive versus negative emotions. 
That is, it has been argued that positive and negative emotions are not recognized 
equally fast, although there is some controversy about the direction of this effect. 
Fox et al. (2000) claim that angry facial expressions are detected more rapidly than 
happy expressions, whereas Leppänen and Hietanen (2004) report that positive facial 
expressions are recognized faster than negative ones. (Note, however, that closer 
inspection of the stimuli used in these studies reveals that the angry stimuli of the 
last two experiments reported in Fox et al., 2000, are similar to the sad stimuli in 
the experiments of Leppänen & Hietanen, 2004, basically using very similar stylized 
emoticons to reflect these emotions.) Potentially, the valency effect on recognition 
speed, in whichever direction, may partly be due to timing-related differences in facial 
expressions. In addition, there is work on the time-course of intermodal binding of 
emotions, where it appears that integration of emotional information from the face 
and from the voice occurs at an early stage of processing (before both modalities have 
been fully processed), and uses low-level perceptual features (de Gelder et al., 1999). 
According to Pourtois et al. (2000), intermodal binding of emotions occurs around 
110 ms post-stimulus, which is earlier than the processing of intermodal speech, 
which lies around 200 ms post-stimulus (Pourtois et al., 2000; see also Sekiyama  
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et al., 2003). However, as mentioned above, these studies work with the presentation of 
static rather than dynamic faces. There is neurological evidence that moving faces are 
processed by a fundamentally different path than static faces (Humphreys, Donelly, 
& Riddoch, 1993).
As mentioned above, many emotion studies rely on “acted” data. The work 
of Ekman (e.g., 1993; Ekman et al., 1987), for instance, is based on posed photo-
graphs of actors, and also in speech research actors are frequently used. Additionally, 
many studies, in line with the McGurk paradigm, make use of stimuli that consist 
of incongruent cues to various emotions (e.g., conflicting visual and auditory cues). 
An important question is whether such stimuli are ecologically valid, in that acted 
or incongruent emotions may be more “controlled” than the spontaneous displays 
of emotions in natural interactions. Neurological studies have shown that voluntary 
expressions are fundamentally different in nature from spontaneous expressions 
(Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Rinn, 1984, 1991). From a corpus study, Valstar, Pantic, 
Ambadar, and Cohn (2006) conclude that these two can be distinguished on the basis 
of the speed, duration, and sequence of brow actions. Similarly, there is some work 
into timing-related differences between spontaneous and posed smiles (also known 
as Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles; see e.g., Ekman, 2004, p.204–209, for a 
description; Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). Cohn and Schmidt (2004) report 
that spontaneous, as opposed to posed smiles, have a smaller amplitude, have an 
onset that is more related to the duration (i.e., longer smiles are slower in onset), can 
have multiple rises of the mouth corners, and are accompanied by other facial actions, 
either simultaneously or immediately following.
In sum, the aim of this article is to look in more detail at the perception of audio-
visual expressions of positive and negative emotions (both congruent and incongruent) 
in spoken language, and to explore the recognition speed of these dynamic expressions 
of positive and negative emotions (both congruent and incongruent). It describes two 
perception experiments and an observational study for which we used Dutch data 
collected via a variant of the Velten technique. This is an experimental method to elicit 
emotional states in participants, by letting speakers produce sentences increasing in 
emotional strength (Velten, 1968). The next section first describes previous work by 
Wilting, Krahmer, and Swerts (2006), whose data were used in the current article. We 
present a brief summary of their method and the results of an experiment in which 
they first elicit congruent and incongruent emotional data from speakers using an 
adaptation of the Velten technique, and then selected film clips (without sound) that 
they showed to observers who had to judge the emotional state of the recorded speakers. 
The later sections describe how the current study uses the data collected by Wilting 
et al.’s research by testing these experimental stimuli in both bimodal and unimodal 
conditions. For reasons described below, the participants in the current study were 
native speakers of Czech, who were not able to understand the lexical content of the 
presented utterances. In the second experiment we test the original experimental 
stimuli (but presented without sound) on Dutch participants using a gating paradigm 
(Grosjean, 1996). Our final study consists of observational analyses of various facial 
expressions in the upper and lower areas of a speaker’s face to see whether certain 
features correlate with reported or perceived emotions from speakers.
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2 Audiovisual recordings
Wilting et al. (2006) used an adapted Dutch version of the original Velten (1968) 
induction procedure, using 120 sentences evenly distributed over three conditions 
(Positive, Neutral and Negative).1 Besides the three conditions described by Velten 
for the induction of congruent emotions (Positive, Neutral, Negative), two “acting” 
conditions were added. In one of these, participants were shown negative sentences 
and were asked to utter these as if they were in a positive emotion (iNcoNgrueNt 
Positive); in the other, positive sentences were shown and participants were instructed 
to utter these in a negative way (iNcoNgrueNt Negative). The sentences showed a 
progression, from neutral (“Today is neither better nor worse than any other day”) 
to increasingly more emotional sentences (“God I feel great!” and “I want to go to 
sleep and never wake up” for the positive and negative sets, respectively), to allow for 
a gradual build-up of the intended emotional state.
Participants were told that the goal of the experiment was to study the effect of 
mood on memory recall (earlier work has revealed that mood induction procedures 
become more effective when the induction serves a clear purpose, e.g., Westermann, 
Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). The instructions, a slightly abridged version of the original 
instructions from Velten, were displayed on the computer screen, and participants were 
instructed to first silently read the texts, after which they had to read them aloud. For 
the congruent conditions, the participants were instructed to try to “feel” and “display” 
the emotion that the sentence was representing, while for the incongruent conditions, 
the participants were instructed to try to “feel” and “display” the opposite emotion.2
During the data collection, the sentences were displayed on a computer screen for 
20 seconds, and participants were instructed to read each sentence, first silently and 
then out loud. Recordings were made from the face and upper body of the speakers 
with a digital camera, and a microphone connected to the camera. Fifty Dutch speakers 
(10 per condition) were recorded in the data collection, 31 female and 19 male, none 
of them being a (professional) actor. The advantage of using different speakers across 
conditions is that, in the perception tests, observers could not base their judgments upon 
the familiarity of the faces, therefore preventing learning effects. Some representative 
stills are shown in Figure 1.
Immediately following this phase, participants had to fill in a short mood ques-
tionnaire (“At this moment, I feel ... ”) derived from Mackie and Worth (1989) and 
Krahmer, van Dorst, and Ummelen (2004), consisting of six seven-point bipolar 
1  We chose to classify the emotions under investigation according to their valence, i.e., positive and 
negative, instead of using a subjective term such as “happy” or “depressed,” because we were only 
interested in the valence of an emotion and not in specific properties of an individual emotion.
2  Note that although the terminology in our instruction reflected only the valence of the emotion, the list 
designed by Velten should invoke the emotions “elation” and “depression” (Velten, 1968). However, 
these two emotions differ primarily along one dimension, i.e., positive to negative, according to the 
dimensional view upon emotions (e.g., Bachorowski, 1999). By instructing the participants to feel 
and display the opposite emotion as the one reflected in the sentences, we tried to direct the way they 
would “act” by the content of the list rather than by terminology.
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semantic differential scales, using the following adjective pairs (English translations 
of Dutch originals): happy/sad, pleasant/unpleasant, satisfied/unsatisfied, content/ 
discontent, cheerful/sullen, and in high spirits/low-spirited. The order of the adjec-
tives was randomized; for ease of processing, negative adjectives were mapped to 
1 and positive ones to 7.
Wilting et al. (2006) reported two main findings. First, from the survey presented 
to participants after the elicitation phase, it turned out that the Velten technique was 
very effective in that the positive and negative emotions could indeed be induced 
through this method, but only for speakers in the congruent conditions; the speakers 
in the incongruent conditions did not feel different from the speakers in the neutral 
condition. Second, observers turned out to be able to reliably distinguish between 
positive and negative emotions on the basis of visual cues; interestingly, the incongruent 
versions led to more extreme scores than the congruent ones, which suggests that the 
incongruent emotions were displayed more strongly than the congruent ones. This raises 
the question in what sense the positive emotions differ from their negative counterparts. 
In this article, we investigate the hypothesis that one difference is durational, especially 
Figure 1
Representative stills of congruent (top) and incongruent (bottom) emotional expressions, 
with on the left-hand side the positive and on the right-hand side the negative versions
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in the onset, assuming that positive emotions appear quicker on the face than negative 
ones, though this may be different for congruent versus incongruent emotions. Also, 
we are interested in the question whether the perception of positive versus negative 
emotions differs across modalities, and whether the perception of congruent versus 
incongruent emotions differs across modalities, and/or whether there is an interaction 
between these two.
In the next study we test these data in both bimodal and unimodal conditions, 
on Czech participants.
3 Experiment I: Crossmodal perception
3.1 Stimuli
From each of the speakers in the recordings, the last sentence was selected. These 
sentences captured the speakers at the maximum height of the induced emotion. We 
chose to use maximum height stimuli, because Horstmann (2002) reported that proto-
typical emotions resemble the most intense expression of an emotion. The previous 
study by Wilting et al. (2006) was conducted with vision-only stimuli presented to 
Dutch participants. It would not have been possible to present the auditory or audio-
visual variants to Dutch participants, as the lexical information would be a give away 
clue for the speaker’s emotional state. Still, we are interested in the perception of the 
audio-only and audiovisual stimuli. Therefore the Dutch sentences were presented to 
Czech participants in the perception test, as they did not understand Dutch.
3.2 Design
The experiment uses a repeated measurements design with modality as between-
subjects factor (with levels: audiovisual: AV, visioN-oNly: VO and audio-oNly: AO), 
condition as within-subjects factor (with levels: iNcoNgrueNt Negative, Negative, 
Neutral, Positive, and iNcoNgrueNt Positive), and perceived emotional state as 
the dependent variable.
3.3 Procedure
Participants were told that they would see or hear 50 speakers in different emotional 
states, and that their task was to rate the perceived state on a seven-point valency 
scale ranging from 1 (= very negative) to 7 (= very positive). Participants were not 
informed about the fact that some of the speakers were displaying an incongruent 
emotion. Within each modality, there were two subgroups of participants, who were 
presented with the same stimuli but in a different random order to compensate for 
potential learning effects. Stimuli were preceded by a number displayed on the screen 
indicating which stimulus would come up next, and followed by a 3 second interval 
during which participants could fill in their score on an answer form. Stimuli were 
shown only once. The experiment was preceded by a short training session consisting 
of five stimuli of different speakers uttering a non-experimental sentence to make 
participants acquainted with the stimuli and the task. If all was clear, the actual experi-
ment started, after which there was no further interaction between the participants 
and the experimenter. The perception tests in the three conditions were conducted as 
a group experiment with the material presented on a large screen at the front of the 
classroom. The entire experiment lasted approximately 10 minutes.
Language and Speech 
10 Perception of emotional speech
3.4 Participants
Fifty-four people (18 per condition) participated in the experiment, nine female and 45 
male, with an average age of 23 (range 21–30). All were students and Ph.D. students from 
the Czech Technical University (Faculty of Electrical Engineering) and the Charles 
University (Faculty of Philosophy and Arts) in Prague, Czech Republic. The choice 
of Czech participants was arbitrary; the only real constraint was that the participants 
should not understand Dutch.
3.5 Statistical analyses
All tests for significance were performed with a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Mauchly’s test for sphericity was used, and when it was significant or could 
not be determined, we applied the Greenhouse-Geisser correction on the degrees of 
freedom. For the sake of transparency, we report on the normal degrees of freedom 
in these cases. Post hoc analyses were performed with the Bonferroni method.
3.6 Results
Figure 2 and Table 1 summarize the results. A repeated measures ANOVA, with 
modality as between-subjects factor, condition as within-subjects factor, and perceived 
emotional state as the dependent variable, shows that condition has a significant effect 
on perceived emotional state, F(4, 204) = 145.042, p < .001, η2p = .740. Repeated contrasts 
revealed that all conditions (level 1: iNcoNgrueNt Negative, level 2: Negative, 
level 3: Neutral, level 4: Positive, and level 5: iNcoNgrueNt Positive) lead to a 
significantly different perceived emotion, F12(1, 51) = 89.558, p < .001, η2p  = .637; F23(1, 
51) = 50.167, p < .001, η2p  = .496; F34(1, 51) = 43.855, p < .001, η2p = .462; F45(1, 51) = 
20.052, p < .001, η2p  = .282. It is interesting to observe that the incongruent emotions 
are perceived as more intense than the congruent ones. Speakers in the iNcoNgrueNt 
Positive condition are overall perceived as the most positive, M = 4.70, SD = 0.53, and 
speakers in the iNcoNgrueNt Negative condition are perceived as the most negative, 
M = 2.72, SD = 0.63. Note that the perceptual difference between incongruent and 
congruent emotional speech is larger for the negative emotions. In general, it seems 
that the incongruent emotions are classified “better,” or interpreted as more intense 
than the congruent emotion.
Table 1
Perceived emotional state on a seven-point scale (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) as 
a function of condition (standard deviations between brackets) as well as condition split 
by modality
Condition AV VO AO Total
iNcoNgr Positive 4.69 (.35) 4.84 (.35) 4.57 (.78) 4.70 (.53)
Positive 4.66 (.46) 4.78 (.46) 3.86 (.95) 4.43 (.77)
Neutral 3.54 (.31) 3.57 (.46) 4.42 (.49) 3.84 (.59)
Negative 3.08 (.49) 3.28 (.47) 3.54 (.77) 3.30 (.61)
iNcoNgr Negative 2.38 (.36) 2.99 (.64) 2.79 (.72) 2.72 (.63)
Total 3.67 (.98) 3.89 (.91) 3.84 (.98) 3.80 (.96)
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Modality does not have a significant main effect on perceived emotional state, 
F(2, 51) = 1.881, p = .163, η2p  = .069, but interestingly there was an interaction between 
condition and modality, F(8, 204) = 10.981, p < .001, η2p  = .301. In all three modalities 
the incongruent emotions are perceived as more intense than the congruent ones; 
speakers in the iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition are perceived as the most positive, 
and speakers in the iNcoNgrueNt Negative condition are perceived as the most 
negative. However, repeated contrasts showed that all levels of condition and modality 
interact significantly with each other, F12(1, 51) = 5.438, p < .01, η2p  = .176; F23(1, 51) 
= 5.254, p < .01, η2p = .171; F34(1, 51) = 41.526, p < .001, η2p  = .620; F45(1, 51) = 13.475, 
p < .001, η2p  = .346. For both the AV and the VO modality the difference between 
Positive and iNcoNgrueNt Positive is very small, DAV = 0.03, and DVO = 0.06, while 
this difference is much larger in the AO modality, DAV = 0.71: for this modality, the 
Positive condition even scored lower on the valency scale than Neutral. On the other 
side of the spectrum, the difference between the Negative and the iNcoNgrueNt 
Negative condition is substantial for the AO and the AV modality, DAV = 0.75, and 
DAV = 0.70, but here the VO modality stands out in the sense that the difference is 
relatively small, DVO = 0.29. In other words, the classification pattern for the AV 
modality resembles the VO modality for the positive moods, while for the negative 
moods the pattern of the AV modality is similar to the AO modality. Note also that 
the difference between the two incongruent emotions is larger in the AV modality, 
DAV = 2.31, somewhat smaller in the VO modality, DVO = 1.85, and the smallest in 
the AO modality, DAV = 1.78. Another interesting point is the difference between the 
facial expressions and vocal expressions in the Positive condition, DVO-AV = 0.92. 
This difference is very large in comparison to the other conditions, apart from the 
Neutral condition, where, in contrast to the Positive condition, the AO modality 
scores higher than the VO modality, DVO-AV = –0.85.










The mean perceived emotional state (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) per condition 
and modality
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Further, we compared the classification of the Czech participants for the frag-
ments presented in the VO modality with the results of the earlier Dutch perception test 
(Wilting et al., 2006), by a repeated measures ANOVA, with nationality as between-
subjects factor, condition as within-subjects factor, and perceived emotional state 
as the dependent variable. It turns out that the main effect of nationality was not 
significant, F(1, 56) = 1.905, p = .173, η2p  = .033. There was a significant interaction 
between nationality and condition, F(4, 224) = 5.088, p < .01, η2p  = .083; however, 
repeated contrasts showed that this difference was only caused by the difference 
between the Negative and the iNcoNgrueNt Negative stimuli, F12(1, 56) = 4.505, p 
= .038, η2p  = .074 (see Figure 3).
3.7 Summary
We have reported on a perception experiment in which Czech participants rated their 
perceived emotional state of Dutch speakers. These speakers could either display a 
positive or a negative emotion, which was either congruent or incongruent. The Czech 
participants were confronted with these utterances in a bimodal (audiovisual) or a 
unimodal (audio-only or vision-only) condition.
There was no overall effect of modality. Further, it was found that incongruent 
emotional speech leads to significantly more extreme perceived emotion scores 
than congruent emotional speech, where the difference between incongruent and 
congruent emotional speech is larger for the negative than for the positive conditions. 
Interestingly, the largest overall differences between incongruent and congruent 
emotions were perceived in the audio-only condition, which suggests that displaying 
an incongruent emotion has a particularly strong effect on the spoken realization of 
emotions. This difference between the congruent and the incongruent conditions is 
in particular larger for the positive emotions. In addition, comparing the different 
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modalities suggests that positive emotions are clearer in the visual modality (since the 
highest scores were obtained in the AV and VO modalities), while the classification 
of negative emotions in the AV modality follows the pattern of the AO modality. 
Another interesting point is the difference between facial and vocal expression within 
the separate conditions. It seems that the Velten procedure did not elicit recognizable 
vocal expressions in the Positive condition, whereas it elicited recognizable facial 
expressions. On the other hand, the senders in the iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition 
were able to display recognizable facial and vocal expressions. We also compared 
the classification of the Czech participants for the VO fragments with the results of 
the Dutch perception test with the same stimuli (Wilting et al., 2006), which lead to 
essentially the same results.
Although we have shown that participants can correctly classifiy dynamical 
expressions of (congruent and incongruent) emotions, we did not investigate the 
speed with which these expressions were classified. This is interesting in the light of 
the above-discussed timing differences between spontaneous and voluntary expres-
sions. We also do not know whether there are timing differences between positive 
and negative emotions. The second experiment will investigate whether positive and 
negative emotions (both congruent and incongruent) differ with respect to the speed 
with which they are recognized as such.
4 Experiment II: Incremental perception
4.1 Stimuli
The second perception test is based on the gating paradigm, which is a well-known 
design in spoken word recognition research (Grosjean, 1996). In this paradigm, a spoken 
language stimulus is presented in segments that increase in length and participants are 
asked to propose the word being presented and to give a confidence rating after each 
segment. The dependent variables are the isolation point of the word (i.e., the gate3), 
the confidence ratings at various points in time and the word candidates proposed after 
each segment.
The current perception test resembles this gating design, but only in that we 
present parts of the original sentences used in Wilting et al. (2006), increasing in 
length. To enable comparisons across experiments, the fragments were cut from the 
start of the original fragment as it was used in experiment I. The first segment is very 
short, only consisting of four frames (160 ms). The size of the later segments increases 
in steps of 160 ms until the last, sixth segment, which is 960 ms long. Each segment 
S+1 thus includes the preceding segment S, and extends it by four extra frames (or 
160 extra ms). We only used six segments, because a pilot study indicated that adding 
longer segments did not lead to a substantial increase in recognition accuracy.
The current set-up differs from the “standard” gating approach, in that we do 
not ask participants to give confidence ratings. Rather, after each gate, participants 
have to indicate whether they believe that the speaker is in a positive or in negative 
mood, or whether they cannot make this distinction on the basis of the current gate.
3  In our perception test, the isolation point is rather the gate at which a fragment is correctly recognized 
and where responses for following gates are no longer changed.
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4.2 Design
The experiment uses a repeated measurements design with condition (with levels: 
iNcoNgrueNt Negative, Negative, Neutral, Positive and iNcoNgrueNt Positive) 
and gate (with levels: oNe (i.e., 160 ms), two (i.e., 320 ms), three (i.e., 480 ms), Four 
(i.e., 640 ms), Five (i.e., 800 ms), to six (i.e., 960 ms)) as within-subjects factors, and 
confidence (with levels: non-answers “don’t know” versus answers “positive or nega-
tive”) and perceived emotional state (with levels: “positive” and “negative”) as the 
dependent factors.
4.3 Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were invited into a quiet room, and asked 
to take place in front of the computer. Participants were told that they would see 40 
speakers in different emotional states, and that for each speaker they would see six short, 
overlapping fragments (the gates). The task of the participants was to determine, for each 
gate, whether the speaker was in a positive or in a negative mood. They were given three 
answering possibilities: “negative,” “don’t know,” and “positive.” Three buttons on the 
keyboard were labeled with these answer possibilities, and only after viewing a film clip, 
could participants press one of these buttons, after which the next stimulus appeared. 
Therefore, they could take as much time as they needed for judging the film clip, while 
they were viewing a blank screen. However, the instruction encouraged the participants 
to respond quickly. If they were not sure yet about the emotion of the clip, they could 
use the “don’t know” button, which was designed for this purpose. Participants were not 
informed about the fact that some of the speakers were acting an incongruent emotion.
The gates were presented in a successive format: that is, participants viewed all the 
segments of a sentence, starting with the shortest and finishing with the longest. The gates 
were presented forwards, that is, the first was cut from the beginning of the sentence and 
then increasingly longer stretches were added, thus later segments were approaching the 
end (“left-to-right”). Stimulus groups (containing six gates) were preceded by a number 
displayed on the screen indicating which stimulus group would come up next, and 
followed by the first segment only after which the participants could press the appropriate 
button to indicate their answers. Stimuli were shown only once. Stimulus groups were 
presented in one of four random orders, to compensate for potential learning effects. 
The fragments were only presented visually, without the corresponding sound; therefore 
the lexical or grammatical content could not influence the participants’ decision. Also, 
no feedback was given to participants about the correctness of their scores.
The experiment was preceded by a short training session consisting of one 
stimulus group containing six gate-segments, uttered by a single speaker uttering a 
non-experimental, neutral sentence to make participants acquainted with the stimuli 
and the task. If all was clear, the actual experiment started, after which there was no 
further interaction between the participants and the experimenter. The entire experi-
ment lasted approximately 25 minutes.
4.4 Participants
Forty people (10 per presentation order) participated in the experiment, 33 female and 
seven male, with an average age of 19 (range 18–27). All were students from Tilburg 
University in The Netherlands, none had participated as a speaker in the study by Wilting 
et al. (2006) or in experiment I, and all were unaware of the experimental question.
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4.5 Statistical analyses
All tests for significance were performed with a repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s 
test for sphericity was used, and when it was significant or could not be determined, 
we applied the Greenhouse-Geisser correction on the degrees of freedom. For the sake 
of transparency, we report on the normal degrees of freedom in these cases. Post hoc 
analyses were performed with the Bonferroni method.
4.6 Results
We report on the results in two steps. First we look at the percentages of answers and 
non-answers as a function of gate, and next we look at the number of positive and 
negative answers as a function of gate.
First of all, we present the general distribution of responses across the conditions 
in Table 2.4
4.6.1 Non-answers versus answers
For this analysis, we recoded the responses such that non-answers (“don’t know”) were 
mapped to a value of 0 (= no decision made), and answers (“negative” or “positive”) 
were mapped to 1. There were 1112 non-answers, which is 11.6% of all responses. There 
were a total of 191 missing values, which is 2% of all responses; these were replaced 
4  There seems to be a response bias towards negative responses, i.e., the number of  “positive 
responses” for the positive and the incongruent positive conditions is higher than the number of 
“don’t know” responses. Therefore, within these conditions, the mean perceived emotional state 
“drops” in the later gates. This could be caused by the successive forward presentation format. 
According to Grosjean (1996), in this design potential artefacts may occur: “The successive 
presentation format may induce response perseveration and negative feedback. This in turn may 
yield a slightly conservative picture of recognition.” However, the tendency for less extreme or 
more negative responses in the positive condition is in line with the results of Wilting et al. (2006) 
and with the results in the first perception experiment. Therefore, we do not consider this to be 
a problem.
Table 2
Perceived emotional state as a function of condition (standard errors between brackets) 
as well as condition split by gate
Gate 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
iNcoNgr 0.81 0.77  0.74  0.74  0.75  0.75  0.76 
Positive (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Positive 0.76 0.67  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.64  0.67 
 (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Negative 0.26 0.23  0.25 0.26  0.23  0.22  0.24 
 (.04) (.03)  (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
iNcoNgr 0.20  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.15 
Negative (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Total 0.51 0.46  0.44  0.45  0.44  0.44  
 (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
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with the mean value over the 10 speakers per segment/gate. Figure 4 shows the propor-
tion of answers as a function of gate. We assumed that the proportion of answers is a 
reflection of the level of confidence that the participants have in their ability to make 
a correct judgment at that particular gate. What this figure shows is that we find the 
most non-answers for the first gate, and the congruent emotions get more non-answers 
than their incongruent counterparts. In all conditions, the percentage of answers 
increases over the next gates, and seems to reach a plateau after the fourth gate (640 
ms). Also, the speed of recognition (i.e., how much visual information, defined as the 
number of gates, is needed) differs for positive versus negative emotions. Taking an 
80% threshold,5 it can be seen that the recognition of positive emotions reaches this 
level already at gate 2 (congruent: M = 0.83, SE = 0.028; incongruent: M = 0.87, 
SE = 0.025), while the negative emotions reach this level only at gate 3 (congruent: 
M = 0.87, SE = 0,031; incongruent: M = 0.87, SE = 0.026).
A repeated measures ANOVA with condition and gate as within-subjects factors 
and proportion of answers (i.e., the confidence) as the dependent variable shows that 
condition has a significant effect on the relative proportion of answers, F(3, 117) = 8.051, 
p < .001, h2p  = .171. Post hoc analyses reveal that the positive conditions differ from 
the negative ones (p < .05) but the congruent conditions do not differ significantly 
from the incongruent ones. The relative proportion of answers also differs across the 
5  Grosjean (1996) reports on a study that used this threshold as a recognition point, although there is 
no consensus about which threshold reflects the “real” recognition point.













The mean proportion of  answers (vs. non-answers) as a function of  gate (in ms) for  
different emotions
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gates, F(5, 195) = 47.138, p < .001, h2p  = .547. Post hoc analyses reveal that all gates 
differ significantly from each other, p < .01, except gate 4 and 5, p = 1. Finally, there 
is an interaction between condition and gate, F(15, 585) = 2.914, p < .01, h2p  = .070.
We also performed univariate analyses within a condition, with gate as within-
subjects factor and proportion of answers as the dependent variable, in order to see how 
the relative proportion of answers across the gates differs between positive and nega-
tive emotions, both congruent and incongruent. Within the iNcoNgrueNt Negative 
condition, F(5, 195) = 33.529, p < .001, h2p  = .462, post hoc analyses show that gates
1 to 4 differ significantly from each other, p < .05. Within the Negative condition, F(5, 
195) = 34.622, p < .001, h2p  = .470, gates 1 to 3 differ significantly from each other, p < 
.001. Within the Positive condition, F(5, 195) = 40.511, p < .001, h2p  = .510, gates 1 to 
3 differ significantly from each other, p < .01, as well as gates 4 and 6, p < .05. Within 
the iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition, F(5, 195) = 30.774, p < .001, h2p  = .441, gates
1 to 3 differ significantly from each other, p < .01, as well as gates 3 and 6, p < .05.
Finally, we performed univariate analyses within gate 1, with condition as within-
subjects factor and proportion of answers as the dependent variable, in order to see 
whether the differences between conditions are present from the beginning. For gate 
1, F(3,117) = 5.949, p < .01, η2p = .132, post hoc analyses revealed that all conditions 
differ significantly from each other, p < .05, except the Positive condition, which does 
not differ from any condition.
4.6.2 Perceived emotional state
For this analysis, we recoded the original responses such that the “negative” responses 
obtained a value of 0, and the “positive” responses obtained a value of 1. The “don’t 
know” responses were treated the same as the missing values. All these non-answers 
were subsequently replaced by the mean of the 10 presented speakers per segment/gate. 
We used this strategy because the “don’t know” responses were already processed in 
the first step of the statistical analyses. In this successive step we want to know whether 
the distribution of positive versus negative answers differs across the conditions for all 
those cases where the participants were certain about their classification and therefore 
did choose an answer. So, while the first step reflects the level of uncertainty across 
all responses, this step reflects the ‘correctness’6 of the answers for all the ‘certain’ 
responses. For this analysis, there was a total of 1303 non-answers, which is 13.6% of 
all responses. Data are shown in Figure 5.
A repeated measures ANOVA, with condition and gate as within-subjects factors 
and perceived emotional state as the dependent variable, shows that condition has a 
significant effect on the perceived emotional state, F(3, 117) = 219.238, p < .001, η2p 
= .849. Post hoc analyses reveal that all conditions differ significantly from each 
other, p < .001. It is interesting to observe that the incongruent emotions received 
more extreme mean classification scores than the congruent ones. Speakers in the 
iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition are overall classified as the most positive, M = 0.76, 
SE = 0.018, and speakers in the iNcoNgrueNt Negative condition are classified as 
the most negative, M = 0.15, SE = 0.021. The perceived emotional state also differs 
across gates, F(5, 195) = 9.689, p < .001, η2p = .199. Post hoc analyses show that only 
6  Therefore, this level is comparable with the variable word candidates in the standard gating paradigm.
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gate 1 differs significantly from all other gates, p < .05. Finally, there is no interaction 
between condition and gate, F(15, 585) = 2.036, p = .06, η2p = .050.
As with the previous tests on relative proportion of answers, we also performed 
univariate analyses within a condition, with gate as within-subjects factor and perceived 
emotional state as the dependent variable. Within the iNcoNgrueNt Negative condi-
tion, F(5,195) = 3.298, p < .05, η2p = .078, post hoc analyses revealed no significant 
differences. Within the Negative condition, only gates 4 and 6 differ significantly 
from each other, p < .05; however, the overall effect of gate is not significant, F(5, 195) 
= 0.867, p = .442, η2p = .022. Within the Positive condition, F(5, 195) = 9.586, p < .001, 
η2p = .197, only gate 1 differs significantly from all other gates, p < .05, except for gate 
2, which does not differ significantly from any other gate.7 Within the iNcoNgrueNt 
Positive condition, F(5, 195) = 4.736, p < .01, η2p = .108, only gates 1 and 4 differ 
significantly from each other, p < .05. Therefore, it seems that in general, after gate 1, 
there are no substantial differences anymore in the classification patterns.
7  It is important to realize that these scores reflect the patterns after participants were certain about 
their classification, because the “don’t know” responses were treated as non-answers. In the first step 
it was found that the recognition speed was faster for the positive than for the negative emotions. 
Therefore, it is possible that the more positive classification in the first gate reflects the part of the 
population that is more certain about their answers, i.e., that an interaction is possible between the 
level of confidence and the extremity of the responses.












The mean perceived emotional state (0 = negative, 1 = positive) as a function of gate for 
different emotions
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Because the confidence levels do not change substantially either in gates 4 to 6, it 
is interesting to look at the classification patterns within the first three gates. To test 
this, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA, with condition and gate as within-
subjects factors and perceived emotional state as the dependent variable, within the 
first three gates. Here, the effect of condition is again significant, F(3, 117) = 212.042, 
p < .001, η2p = .845, as well as the effect of gate, F(2, 78) = 10.551, p < .001, η2p = .213. 
Post hoc analyses showed that only gate 1 differs significantly from gates 2 and 3, p < 
.01. So, it seems that there is a transition point at gate 2, which can be compared with 
the isolation point in the standard gating paradigm. There was again no interaction 
between condition and gate, F(6, 234) = 2.261, p = .06, η2p = .055.
Finally, because we were interested in the effect of condition within gate 1, 
we performed a univariate ANOVA with condition as within-subjects factor and 
perceived emotional state as the dependent variable, in order to explore how partici-
pants recognize emotions within the shortest time interval. Within the first gate, 
the effect of condition is significant, F(3, 117) = 127.729, p < .001, η2p = .766. Post 
hoc analyses show that the positive conditions (i.e., the positive and the incongruent 
positive) differ from both negative ones, p < .05, but the congruent conditions 
(i.e., the positive and the negative) do not differ from the incongruent conditions. 
The positive conditions are correctly classified as more positive (congruent: M = 
0.76, SE = 0.027; incongruent: M = 0.81, SE = 0.027) and the negative conditions are 
correctly classified as more negative (congruent: M = 0.26, SE = 0.036; incongruent: 
M = 0.20, SE = 0.03).
4.7 Summary
In this study, we used a gating paradigm to test the recognition speed for various 
emotional expressions from a speaker’s face. Participants were presented with video 
clips of speakers who displayed positive or negative emotions, which were either 
congruent or incongruent. Using a gating paradigm, the clips were shown in successive 
segments which increase in length.
We first calculated the confidence scores, which are the number of times that 
the subjects made a classification related to the number of times that they could 
not yet make a classification. We found the most non-answers for the first gate, and 
the congruent emotions got more non-answers than their incongruent counterparts. 
Further, in all conditions, the percentage of answers increased over the next gates, 
and reached a plateau after the fourth gate (640 ms). Also, the proportion of answers 
increased faster for the positive than for the negative emotions.
Next, we analyzed the valence of answers. Results show that participants are 
surprisingly accurate in their recognition of the various emotions, as they already reach 
high recognition scores in the first gate (after only 160 milliseconds). Interestingly, 
this recognition plateau is reached earlier for positive than negative emotions. Finally, 
incongruent emotions get more extreme recognition scores than congruent emotions, 
and already after a short period of exposure, perhaps because the incongruent record-
ings contain more expressive displays.
Given the previous two perception experiments, the next section discusses an 
observational analysis that aims to find possible visual correlates of emotional expres-
sions, both in the upper and lower area of the face.
Language and Speech 
20 Perception of emotional speech
5 Observational analyses
To gain further insight into which facial cues could have influenced the subjects’ 
categorization, we annotated all fragments in terms of a number of facial features. 
Although much is known about the prototypical expressions of emotions (Ekman, 
1993), less is known about the difference in facial cues displayed in congruent and 
incongruent emotions (Wilting et al., 2006). Also, while past research has shown 
which facial cues are prototypical for pictures of emotions of joy and sadness, a 
second question is whether temporal dynamics such as the duration and the intensity 
of these cues can be successful in distinguishing between these positive and negative 
emotions, as these dynamics have already been shown to be successful in signaling 
the difference between congruent and incongruent displayals (Cohn & Schmidt, 2004; 
Valstar et al., 2006). Because temporal aspects of facial features are extremely difficult 
to assess manually and often require the use of advanced computer models (Cohn & 
Katz, 1998; Valstar et al., 2006), we chose to annotate solely whether or not a (number 
of chosen) feature(s) occurred, and the subjective intensity of these cues, rather than 
their exact duration and amplitude.
We concentrate on a small set of features. The chosen features are roughly 
comparable with Action Units described by Ekman and Friesen (1978), though there 
is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping to these Action Units. The choice of these 
features was based upon two restrictions: we wanted to score the upper as well as the 
lower face, and further we chose a set of features we assumed to reflect a positive as 
well as a negative emotion.
For the upper face we chose the following two features:
 1. Raising the brows. This feature resembles the Action Unit combination 1 + 2.
 2.  Frowning upwards, that is, raising the brows and frowning. This feature 
resembles the Action Unit combination 1 + 4.
For the lower face we chose the features:
 3.  Smiling, that is, pulling the corners of the mouth aside and up. This 
feature resembles the Action Unit 12.
 4.  Lowering the mouth, that is, pulling the corners of the mouth down. 
This feature resembles the Action Unit 15.
The labeling was performed by three judges, the first author of this article and 
two independent Ph.D. students, who were unfamiliar with the purpose of the current 
study, but who were experienced with visual annotations. The procedure was as follows. 
The judges watched the film fragments and labeled them using the set of four features. 
Each judge labeled each feature individually. The labeling process took place blind 
for condition. We asked the labelers to score the maximum intensity that the feature 
reached in the entire film clip. The presence of the feature was largely determined on 
the labelers’ subjective impression of whether the feature occurred or not. Each feature 
was given a number between 0 and 2 to reflect different strengths, where 0 stands for 
a complete absence and 2 represents a very clear presence of the facial feature. The 
scores for the features were subsequently summed across the three judges resulting in 
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an overall score between 0 and 6 for the respective features. For instance, when coder 
1 scored a 2, and the other two coders scored a 1, the overall score was a 4. This way of 
computing of the intensity by summing up the scores of the three labelers is consistent 
with the method of Hirschberg, Litman, and Swerts (2004) and Barkhuysen, Krahmer, 
and Swerts (2004) to label auditory and visual degrees of hyperarticulation.
For each labeled feature, we computed the Pearson correlation. The correlation 
was significant between all three coders for all the four features (raising the brows, 
r12 = 0.61, p < .01; r13 = 0.67, p < .01; r23 = 0.74, p < .01; frowning upwards, r12 = 0.76, 
p < .01; r13 = 0.56, p < .01; r23 = 0.41, p < .01; and smiling, r12 = 0.68, p < .01; r13 = 0.74, 
p < .01; r23 = 0.77, p < .01). The correlation was somewhat lower for lowering the mouth, 
r12 = 0.38, p < .01; r13 = 0.35, p < .01; r23 = 0.44, p < .01, but still significant.
5.1 Results
First of all, we present the general distribution of responses across the conditions in 
Table 3. According to Table 3, the two features within either the upper (brows) or lower 
Figure 6
Representative examples of the four annotated features: upper face (top) and lower face 
(bottom) expressions, with on the left-hand side the positive and on the right-hand side 
the negative versions
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face (mouth) behave in an opposite way. Further, the intensity of the mouth is dependent 
upon condition, while the brows are independent from the valency of the condition.
5.1.1 Valency of the emotion of the speaker in the fragment
In this section, we explore to what extent there is a relation between the valence of the 
emotional state of the speaker in the fragment and the intensity of the annotated visual 
features described above. A univariate ANOVA was performed for each of the separate 
features, with condition as independent factor (iNcoNgrueNt Negative, Negative, 
Neutral, Positive, iNcoNgrueNt Positive) and the feature as dependent factor 
(raisiNg the brows, FrowNiNg uPwards, smiliNg and loweriNg the mouth). There 
was a significant effect of condition on smiliNg, F(4, 45) = 13.727, p < .001, η2p = .55, 
in the sense that the intensity of smiliNg increases in the (congruent as well as incon-
gruent) positive conditions (congruent: M = 2.9, SE = 0.446, and incongruent: M = 3.7, 
SE = 0.446). Post hoc analyses revealed that for smiliNg, the positive conditions differ 
from the negative ones, p < .01, but the congruent conditions do not differ significantly 
from their incongruent counterparts (e.g., Positive did not differ from iNcoNgrueNt 
Positive). Further, the Neutral condition differed from the positive ones, p < .01. 
There was also a significant effect of condition on loweriNg the mouth, F(4, 45) 
= 5.940, p < .01, η2p = .346, in the sense that the intensity of LoweriNg the mouth 
increases in the (congruent as well as incongruent) negative conditions (congruent: M = 
2.1, SE = 0.410 and incongruent: M = 2.9, SE = 0.410). Post hoc analyses revealed that 
for loweriNg the mouth only the iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition differed from 
the two negative conditions. So, smiliNg occurs more in the positive conditions, while 
loweriNg the mouth occurs more often in the negative conditions (the latter only 
across congruent and incongruent conditions). This validates the data along with the 
well-known literature on facial expressions. The upper face did not vary consistently 
across conditions: the other two features were non-significant.
5.1.2 Incongruent vs. congruent emotions of the speaker in the fragment
Also, we are interested in whether there was a relationship between the intensity of these 
features and whether the speaker was displaying an emotional expression which was 
Table 3
Distribution of utterances from experiment I in terms of their mean scored intensity 
(standard errors in brackets) as a function of condition
 Incongruent    Incongruent 
Condition negative Negative Neutral Positive positive Total
Raising the 2.20 (.61) 0.80 (.25) 0.80 (.59) 1.20 (.44) 2.70 (.86) 1.54 (.27) 
brows
Frowning 0.60 (.40) 0.30 (.15) 1.00 (.68) 0.70 (.47) 0.00 (.00) 0.52 (.19) 
upwards
Smiling 0.40 (.40) 0.20 (.13) 0.40 (.16) 2.90 (.71) 3.70 (.54) 1.52 (.28)
Lowering the 2.90 (.48) 2.10 (.43) 1.70 (.50) 1.30 (.40) 0.20 (.13) 1.64 (.22) 
mouth
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incongruent with the lexical content of the utterance. Although the univariate ANOVA 
did not show an overall effect for raising the brows, inspection of Figure 6 and Table 
3 tells us that the intensity of raising the brows tends to increase in the incongruent 
conditions (negative: M = 2.2, SE = 0.586 and positive: M = 2.7, SE = 0.586), while the 
other three features do not seem to have a correlation. In order to test this further, we 
performed separate t-tests for each feature. In these tests, both incongruent conditions 
(negative and positive) as an ‘incongruent’ group were compared with a second group 
containing the two congruent conditions. It was shown that indeed only the feature 
raisiNg the brows was significant, t = –2.529, d.f. = 38, p < .05. Therefore, the brows 
are raised more intensely in the incongruent conditions.
5.1.3 Emotional intensity of each feature in the fragment as  
perceived by the judges
Next, we are interested in whether there is a relationship between the intensity of 
the annotated features for each fragment (as it was scored by the three coders) and 
the perceived emotional state of the fragment such as it was classified in perception 
experiment I (by the Czech judges). Figure 7 shows the mean intensity of the scored 
feature as a function of mean perceived emotional state (1 = very negative, 7 = very 
positive) in experiment I (in the VO condition). Again, the intensity of the mouth 
movements increases as the perceived valency of the emotional state grows stronger 
(in either direction), while the brows seem uncorrelated.
In order to test this, correlational analyses were performed between the four 
features and the mean perceived emotional state in experiment I (in the VO condition). 
The Pearson correlations for the features smiliNg, r = 70.4, p < .01, and loweriNg the 
mouth, r = –58.4, p < .01, were significant, though in opposite directions. The other 
two features were non-significant. Therefore, the more a fragment was perceived as 
positive, the more smiling occurred in the fragment. Vice versa, when the fragment 
was perceived as less positive, lowering the mouth was scored as more intense.
5.2 Summary
We were interested in the difference in occurrence of facial cues displayed in positive 
and negative conditions (both congruent and incongruent), and whether the intensity of 
facial cues can be useful for distinguishing between these conditions. The annotation 
analyses revealed that the occurrence of the features smiliNg, loweriNg the mouth 
and raisiNg the brows varies consistently across conditions. The data showed that 
smiliNg and loweriNg the mouth correlated with the perceived emotion: smiliNg 
is scored as more intense in the positive conditions, while loweriNg the mouth is 
scored as more intense in the negative conditions. Also, because raisiNg the brows 
is scored as more intense in the incongruent conditions, raisiNg the brows can be 
used to detect whether a speaker is displaying an emotion that is opposite to the 
lexical content of the sentence. Another question was whether there is a relationship 
between the emotional state of the fragment as it was perceived in experiment I, and 
the intensity of the annotated features as they were displayed in the fragments. The 
data showed that the more a fragment was perceived as positive, the higher the scored 
intensity of the smiliNg was. Vice versa, when the fragment was perceived as less 
positive, loweriNg the mouth was scored as more intense.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we investigated whether dynamic auditory and visual cues of emotional 
speech differ in perceptual strength, and how people deal with input coming from 
two modalities when they have to make judgments about a speaker’s emotional state. 
In addition, we were interested in how fast people would recognize various emotions 
when presented with fragments of speech. Previous research has brought to light that 
listeners can successfully infer the emotional state of a speaker using information from 
different modalities (see e.g., Adolphs, 2002; Bachorowski, 1999; Banse & Scherer, 1996; 
Carroll & Russell, 1996; Scherer, 2003; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). However, while there 
is much insight into how unimodal stimuli (either auditory or visual) are processed, 
less is known about the extent to which these modalities interact with each other. 





































The mean perceived emotional state (1 = very negative, 4 = neutral, 7 = very positive) such 
as each fragment was classified by the Czech participants in experiment I, as a function 
of the mean intensity of each feature (0 = no intensity, 6 = very intense) for that fragment 
such as it was scored by the three coders
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Also, while much research has been done in the field of audiovisual speech processing, 
less work has been done about crossmodal integration in the context of emotional 
speech. Next, there is more knowledge available about online auditory speech than 
about online visual speech, because many studies combined a dynamic speech signal 
with static facial images. In order to answer such research questions, we collected 
utterances in a semi-spontaneous way using a experimental paradigm eliciting positive 
and negative emotions. In this paradigm, the participants, while being videotaped, had 
to reproduce sentences increasing in emotional strength. The display of the negative 
or positive emotions could be congruent or incongruent with the lexical content of 
the sentences. Using these utterances, two perception experiments were carried out.
The first experiment was a classification experiment with Czech participants to 
make sure that the participants could not rely on lexical cues. These participants were 
confronted with a selection of the recorded fragments, presented in three formats: 
audiovisual (AV), visioN-oNly (VO) and audio-oNly (AO). The task for participants 
was to indicate on a seven-point scale whether the speaker in the fragment was in 
a positive or a negative emotion. It was found that the highest scores were found in 
the AV and VO modalities, suggesting that the positive emotions are more clear in 
the visual modality, while the lowest scores were found in the AV and AO modality, 
suggesting that the negative emotions are more clear in the auditory modality. This is 
consistent with other findings (Scherer, 2003, pp.235–236). Further, the AV modality 
was always scored best, suggesting that the combination of two modalities contains 
more information than a single modality, although the difference between the AV 
modality and the two single modalities was not significant. We also compared the 
classification of the Czech participants for the VO fragments with the results of 
the Dutch perception test with the same stimuli (Wilting et al., 2006), which lead 
to essentially the same results. Therefore, it seems that the recognition of emotions 
was not influenced by cultural differences (or by the fact that the Czech language 
may use different intonational patterns). See Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) for more 
discussion on such issues.
A second question we explored in this article is to what extent the recognition of 
emotion varies as a function of the time that people are exposed to the facial expressions 
of a speaker. In order to answer this question, a second experiment was conducted. 
In a gating experiment participants were offered short parts of the original fragments 
increasing in length, from 160 ms (4 video frames) to 960 ms (24 video frames). After 
each gate participants had to indicate whether they believed that the speaker was in a 
positive or negative mood, and whether they could make the distinction on the basis 
of the current gate. The results showed that the participants already reached high 
recognition scores in the first gate. The confidence of the participants, determined 
as the moment where they chose either a positive or a negative emotion rather than 
the neutral option, reached a plateau in the fourth gate. Interestingly, this recognition 
plateau is reached earlier for positive than negative emotions, which is comparable 
to the valency effects reported by Leppänen and Hietanen (2004). It is interesting to 
consider that in the latter experiment people need 635 ms processing time to correctly 
classify a picture of a happy face (95.5%), while in the current experiment 160–480 ms 
of information seems to be sufficient for classifying a film clip of a speaker in a positive 
state. As our confidence scores reach a plateau after 640 ms, which is consistent with 
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the scores reported by Leppänen and Hietanen (2004), it might be useful to make a 
distinction between the capability of correctly classifying an emotion, which is already 
possible after only 160 ms, and the confidence people have in their ability to make a 
correct classification, which reaches the top level only after 640 ms.
To ensure the ecological validity of the emotions studied, one has to consider 
several problems. A problem with many emotion studies is that they often rely on 
“acted” data. The work of Ekman (e.g., 1993; Ekman et al., 1987), for instance, is based 
on posed photographs of actors; actors are also frequently used in speech research. 
Additionally, the comparison of the role of different modalities is often investigated 
by using congruent versus incongruent speech analogous to McGurk tasks. This 
raised the question whether the incongruent emotions are representative of acted, 
voluntary emotions or whether they are representative of real, spontaneous emotions. 
Wilting et al. (2006) addressed this problem by creating an “acting” condition: by 
asking the participants to display an emotion that was opposite to the lexical content 
of the sentences in the Velten task, such “incongruent” sentences become similar to 
“acted emotions” as speakers are displaying an emotion they are not feeling. The 
participants in the congruent task, on the other hand, were free to express the emotion 
invoked by the sentences. We can be sure that they were indeed feeling the congruent 
emotion because Wilting et al. (2006) tested which emotion they felt by presenting a 
survey afterwards. Although the survey indicated that the participant’s emotions in 
the incongruent conditions was not different from the neutral condition, it would be 
interesting to further refine this test in the future, for example, to find out whether there 
is indeed an absence of emotion or whether they may have started to feel a mixture 
of emotions. It would be nice if future studies could supplement the current study 
with findings of brain research or arousal measures such as galvanic skin response.
The first perception test showed that incongruent emotional speech leads to 
significantly more extreme perceived emotion scores than congruent emotional speech, 
while the difference between incongruent and congruent speech is larger for the 
negative than for the positive emotions. This is in line with past research (Wilting 
et al., 2006), suggesting that incongruent emotions are perceived as more intense than 
congruent ones (possibly because they are displayed more intensely). It is interesting 
to note, though, that especially the negative incongruent expressions appear to be 
“ironic,” which may have been caused by the mismatch between the form and the 
lexical content (see e.g., Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003, for a discussion about 
multimodal markers of irony). It would be interesting to replicate the experiment in 
the future, where the participants have to utter a sentence containing a neutral lexical 
content after the last sentence of the (positive or negative) list, which may be used in 
the perception studies instead. Further, de Gelder, and Vroomen (2000) report on the 
relative importance of the face above the voice for judging a (portrayed) emotion. Here, 
the difference between the two incongruent emotions was indeed somewhat larger in 
the VO modality than in the AO modality. Another interesting point is the difference 
between facial and vocal expression within the separate conditions. It seems that the 
Velten procedure did not elicit recognizable vocal expressions in the Positive condi-
tion, whereas it elicited recognizable facial expressions. On the other hand, the senders 
in the iNcoNgrueNt Positive condition were able to display recognizable facial and 
vocal expressions. According to de Gelder and Vroomen (2000), there are differences 
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in the effectiveness with which the face and the voice convey different emotions. The 
recognition of happiness, for example, remains accessible when the face is presented 
upside down, and also in focal brain damage patients where the recognition of several 
facial expressions is impaired, while, on the other hand, in the voice happiness is 
sometimes hard to tell apart from other emotions. Our results suggest that happiness 
in the voice can be detected when the senders are acting that they are happy, while, in 
fact, they do not necessarily feel that way.
The second perception test showed that the incongruent emotions received these 
more extreme recognition scores already after a short period of exposure. The gating 
results confirm earlier findings where incongruent emotions are perceived as more 
intense than congruent emotions (Wilting et al., 2006), as in the current experiment 
the former get more extreme recognition scores than the latter, and already after a 
short period of exposure, perhaps because the incongruent recordings contain more 
expressive displays. Horstmann (2002) reported that prototypical emotions resemble 
the most intense form of expressing an emotion. Perhaps when acting an incongruent 
emotion, the senders tend to display more prototypical expressions, in contrast to when 
they are free to express spontaneously whatever emotion they are feeling.
To gain further insight into which facial cues could have influenced the subjects’ 
categorization, we annotated all fragments in terms of a number of facial features. 
According to some models (Cohn & Schmidt, 2004; Valstar et al., 2006), dynamic facial 
expressions consist of an initial onset phase, a peak, and an offset phase. In the onset 
phase of an expression, the facial muscles contract until the facial expression reaches 
its apex. In the next phase, the facial feature is at its peak and does not change any 
further until the start of the offset phase. Here, the facial muscles start to relax until 
the facial expression has returned to its neutral position (Valstar et al., 2006). The onset 
phase is usually very quick, ranging from 0.40 to 0.70 seconds in the case of smiles 
(Cohn & Schmidt, 2004). The subjects in our experiments needed only 160–480 ms for 
classifying a film clip of a speaker in a positive state, and their confidence scores reach 
a plateau after 640 ms, equalling the duration of an average onset phase. However, it 
is perfectly possible that displayed facial cues in the fragments were already at their 
apex, as we captured the speakers at the height of the induced emotion (by using only 
the last sentence of the list as a stimulus in the perception test).
We chose to annotate solely whether or not a (number of chosen) feature(s) 
occurred, and the subjective intensity of these cues, rather than their exact duration 
and amplitude. These features were raisiNg the brows, FrowNiNg uPwards, smiliNg 
and loweriNg the mouth. The occurrence of two other possible candidates, that 
is, gaze and head movements, was too low, but these features seem to be correlated 
with end-of-utterance marking (Barkhuysen, Krahmer, & Swerts, 2008). We felt that 
the intensity of the scored features is a reflection of the displayed apex in the offered 
fragments. We investigated to what extent there is a relation between the valence of 
the emotional state of the speaker in the fragment and the annotated visual features 
described above, that is, whether the intensity of facial cues can be successful in 
distinguishing between positive and negative emotions. It was shown that the intensity 
of the mouth was correlated with the intensity of the perceived emotion, in that when 
the mouth is lowered, the fragment is perceived as more negative, while the fragment 
is perceived as more positive when the mouth is smiling.
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Further, we expected that the final intensity of the displayed cue can discriminate 
between congruent, “spontaneous,” and incongruent, “acted” emotions, because posed 
smiles have a smaller amplitude (e.g., Cohn & Katz, 1998), and also the intensity of 
brow actions has been shown to be successful for distinguishing between spontaneous 
and posed expressions (Valstar et al., 2006), although it is not clear in what direction 
this relationship was. Our data showed that only raising the brows tends to increase 
in the incongruent conditions.
Next, we were interested in whether there is a relationship between the emotional 
state of the fragment as it was perceived in perception experiment I, and the intensity 
of the annotated features as they were displayed in the fragments. The data showed 
that the more a fragment was perceived as positive, the more smiling occurred in the 
fragment. Vice versa, when the mouth was lowered more intensely, the fragment was 
perceived as less positive.
Possibly, the configuration of features may be more important than simply distin-
guishing “which feature is responsible for what.” Neurological research shows that 
faces are processed as a whole, apart from the processing path of individual features 
(Adolphs, 2002), and further there are even more specialized routes for the processing of 
moving faces, that is, dynamic, changeable configurations of facial features (Adolphs, 
2002; Humphreys et al., 1993), although there are multiple interactions between the 
several pathways (Vuillemier & Pourtois, 2007). Also, the timing and coordination of 
the various regions of the face are usually off the mark in posed expressions (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1978). However, based upon the annotation results it is very likely that at least 
information from the mouth could have been very useful. Although the upper face in 
general, in particular the eyes, is reported as the most important source for emotion 
recognition, combining vocal expressions with facial expressions may draw attention 
to the mouth, unintentionally making the lower part of the face the most important 
source (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). It is therefore possible that in emotional speech, 
other facial features are more important than in emotional expressions without speech.
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